 |
We're built to recognize patterns. But these faculties aren't perfect, and frequently we'll find ourselves struggling to deal with two conclusions, both apparently drawn from observation, that contradict. These moments are some of the most potent for learning, since we're compelled to explore the conclusions' origins, analyze them, and puzzle out the secret solution, abandoning a previously-held belief in the process.
Sometimes, even when we know conclusion X is correct (and Y is incorrect), we're afraid to commit to it. That's because there's a third conclusion, Z, with which we're intimately familiar and in which we absolutely believe, that appears to be resting on Y for support.
There's a surprisingly common and effective solution to these dilemmas. The solution is this: Pretend, for the moment, that Z doesn't need Y at all. Find a way to express Z in other terms. Analyze -- dissect and boil down -- what Z is really all about.
-
Here's a thought experiment. You're sitting in a locked, sealed booth high above some train tracks. The one-way windows cannot be broken, but afford a look to the tracks below. A lever in the room you're in controls which track the train switches to: 1, 2 or 3.
Innocent people are tied up to each track.
The lever's default position is position 1. Track 1 will certainly cause the train to kill 20 innocent people.
Track 2 will certainly cause the train to kill 10 innocent people.
Track 3 will certainly cause the train to kill 5 innocent people.
You value human lives extremely highly, and have only moments to act. What do you do?
-
The correct answer is to flip the lever to track 3, so that only 5 innocent people are killed.
This thought experiment isn't really a rational dilemma. The correct decision is certainly to flip the lever to 3. The value in this thought experiment is in seeing what wrong answers people often give.
Among those wrong answers is the notion that it is morally unacceptable to flip the lever at all; that by doing nothing, you're clear of responsibility for anything that occurs. This kind of absurd thinking is often put into terms of "omission" versus "commission"; a man might claim that consiously omitting action is "less intense," in terms of moral responsibility, than conciously committing action.
The thing is, we feel a difference between omission and commission when we think about all sorts of moral dilemmas. There simply must be a functional difference between the two!
In other words, we know that we need to switch the track (X is true) rather than leave it alone in an attempt at avoiding responsibility -- such an attempt would be a failure (Y is false). But doesn't that conclusion undermine our notion of omission being less blameworthy than commission (Z)? Must we finally conclude that Z is also false?
-
The solution: Circumstantially, omission is often less blameworthy than commission. We run into dilemmas all the time where due to situational factors, most commonly ignorance (and the apprehension of risk that comes with it), omission is more prudent. That doesn't make it consequentially bulletproof, but what general principle is?
The 3-track thought experiment intentionally creates a situation wherein omission is more blameworthy than commission. It's a lesson in how imperativism must always be ready to bow out when the pragmatic route is obvious.
3 comments:
Another interesting version I've heard is one where there's a fat man standing next to you. Your fourth option is to push him onto the track in front of the impending doom. He is fat enough to stop the train completely at the cost of his own life. The best move is obviously to do this; only one person dies. But the distinction that horrifies people is that you are not just sacrificing this man; you are using him.
http://i152.photobucket.com/albums/s188/IrishBucket/IMG_0002.jpg
http://i152.photobucket.com/albums/s188/IrishBucket/IMG_0001-1.jpg
So how does this fit into the axiom systems for neo-syllogistic systems (based on ideas of the early 20th century Russian philosopher N. A. Vasiliev), together with topological interpretations? This seems to be in conflict with paraconsistent logic, and atomic propositions of the form: S is and is not P. Thoughts?
Yes, the really interesting train thought experiment is a actually series of experiments that progress like this:
In the first test, you can flip the switch from a track with 5 to a track with one person. Flipping here is clearly seen as the right choice by most people, I believe.
In the second test, there is a train approaching five people and you can push a fat man in front of the train (which somehow will stop it from killing the other 5. You also have to rule out the more noble, you jump in front to save them by saying you're too skinny or something.) Here some people have issue with the physical contact involved in pushing, but generalizing from the last case it still seems to be the right thing to do.
In the third, there are 5 otherwise healthy people in the emergency wing of a hospital, and they need a liver, a kidney, a heart, etc. There is a person in the lobby that you, as a doctor, could kill and take organs from to transplant into the people who need them. In this last case, nearly everyone says it is incredibly wrong to kill someone for his organs, even if it will end up saving 5 people, but it is actually quite tricky to pin down where the difference from the first two lies.
Post a Comment